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 I. Introduction 
 Th ere has been recent debate about whether a new  ‘ Banksy ’ work entitled  ‘ Draw the Raised 
Bridge! ’ on a disused bridge in Hull should be cleaned off  or celebrated as a signifi cant 
contribution to Hull ’ s 2017 city of culture status. 1 A local Conservative councillor was 
reported as stating that the piece  ‘ should be cleaned off . It should be photographed and the 
photograph kept because Banksy is not without talent ’, while a BBC Arts Editor stated, 
 I don ’ t think you can remove it  … I think the whole point of Banksy ’ s work is they are what is 
called site-specifi c  … they work because of the places they ’ ve been put and if you remove the loca-
tion the work loses its power. 2 
 Th e debate refl ects opposing views about graffi  ti and the relationship of power and place. 
Who (particularly if, as in this case, ownership of the locus is unclear) has the right to 
make the decision to remove or leave this Banksy, and why ? How is power over location 
or places  – particularly those which physically and sometimes legally traverse the private/
public divide  – exercised and regulated (and the two may not be synonymous) ? And what 
does this tell us about the law that governs property ? 
 Kevin Brown has comprehensively covered much of the law relating to public space, 
particularly the use of criminal sanctions to control human activity. 3 In this chapter I seek 
to unravel the legal underpinnings, primarily but not solely of private law, which inform 
both the Hull councillor ’ s point of view and the observation of the Arts Editor. In order 
to do this I fi rst look at the idea of taxonomies and how diff erent taxonomical approaches 
to concepts may provide scope for defi ning property more broadly. Drawing on Kevin 
Gray ’ s work, I then consider how a more fl exible, contextually aware defi nition of property 
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might accommodate changing, practical realities. To do this, the focus is on the surfaces 
of the built environment (the ground, walls, bridges, roofs, etc) and activities that chal-
lenge or reframe the concepts underpinning Gray ’ s defi nition, particularly the right to 
exclude. Th is can be illustrated by the Banksy controversy but also by other activities taking 
place in cities, towns and villages, particularly about property falling within the public 
domain. Th e chapter concludes by suggesting that the way in which we defi ne property can 
inform our approach to the taxonomy of property law. 
 II. Th e Taxonomy of Law 
 Sheehan and Arvind 4 suggest that, in its broadest sense, there are three dimensions to the 
taxonomy of law:  ‘ the selection of sets of ideas, categories and concepts used to describe 
and order the subject of study ’ ;  ‘ the basis on which we constitute and give content to these 
concepts and categories ’ ; and  ‘ the relationship between the various categories, concepts 
and ideas we use to describe the area of study ’. Th e taxonomy of law is used to determine 
whether or not a set of facts is subject to a set of rules that give rise to legal consequences: 
 ‘ Taxonomy in law  is about how we treat the subject of our taxonomy. ’ 5 Sheehan and Arvind 
argue that  ‘ the shape of a taxonomy depends on its purpose ’. 6 In this chapter I suggest that 
we might reverse this proposition by starting with the realities of how people relate to urban 
space, using this to inform a defi nition of property which can accommodate the reality, and 
using the concept (or subject) to determine the taxonomy. 
 Not everyone regards the taxonomy of law in the same way. 7 In private law, for example, 
there is considerable debate chiefl y among those who support Peter Birks ’ s line of reason-
ing and those who do not. 8 Th is chapter does not intend to engage with that debate but 
instead to try to extract some bare bones that might be applied in the fi eld of property law. 
Sheehan and Arvind point to two main schools of thought:  ‘ interpretivists ’ and  ‘ contex-
tualists ’. While the former prefer to rely on legal principles of general application justifi ed 
by context-neutral norms (and so are aligned jurisprudentially with legal positivists), the 
latter allow more room for policy and consideration of the actual context in which the law 
is applied (and so are aligned jurisprudentially with legal realism). Contextualists may 
be more ready to accept change because their realist view of the law is more  ‘ socially and 
empirically grounded ’, 9 and their understanding of concepts  ‘ more  evidently linked to social 
facts and circumstances ’. 10 Th e interpretivist school of thought instead adopts a more rigid, 
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socially detached, static view of concepts and the categorisation of these into legal subjects 
(contract, tort etc), preferring certainty and clear rules. 
 Signifi cantly for this chapter, Sheehan and Arvind argue that taxonomies can work 
in diff erent ways. Th ey can be descriptive: used primarily as an organisational tool at a 
particular moment in time or for a particular purpose  – such as might be deployed for 
example in outlining the content of a law module; prescriptive, in which case they tend 
to be rather static  – such as the taxonomy of the law of contracts; or developmental, 
dynamically recognising and accommodating change in both the process and appearance 
of the law  – as found for example in the evolution of equitable solutions to novel prob-
lems. Th e prescriptive approach, while it might create certainty and consistency in the 
application of the law may be of limited use in hard or novel cases. If, then, one adopts 
a  ‘ contextualist ’ and  ‘ developmental ’ approach to the taxonomy of law it might be possible to 
propose a new taxonomy, taking into account social change, challenges to existing norma-
tive underpinnings, and the identifi cation of new values in society that need to be refl ected 
in the law. Th is aligns with  ‘ the realist taxonomic enterprise ’, which Dagan describes as  ‘ both 
backward and forward looking, constantly challenging the continued validity and desirabil-
ity of the normative underpinnings of existing legal categories ’. 11 
 Sheehan and Arvind suggest that  ‘ Taxonomies that seek to be useful  … must not only 
prescribe an ideal answer, but also chart a path by which the legal system gets from its 
current position to the proposed position. ’ 12 
 To do this it is necessary to understand, or to determine the concepts used in the 
taxonomy of any legal category. Th is task can be divided into considering how concepts 
are constructed  – what is their content, and how are they used to determine what falls 
within and what falls without the concept ? Sheehan and Arvind suggest that concepts are 
individuated one from the other and use the example of estoppel. 13 Within this concept 
are sub-concepts; representation in respect of property interests (at least for proprietary 
estoppel), reliance on that representation in some way, and detriment which would not 
have been incurred were it not for the representation and reliance. Th ere is an interrela-
tionship between these sub-concepts that must all be met to satisfy our understanding of 
proprietary estoppel. To determine whether something falls within the concept, a set of facts 
is tested against the sub-concepts. Sheehan and Arvind refer to this approach of looking 
at concepts as  ‘ intension ’ and  ‘ extension ’. Th e intension of a concept is  ‘ the set of conditions 
that a thing must satisfy to fall under the concept ’, 14 while the extension is  ‘ the set of things 
that  … “ fall under ” the concept ’. 15 Some concepts might look similar by extension but their 
intension is diff erent. Sheehan and Arvind use Frege ’ s example of the planet Venus, 16 the 
intension of which may diff er because it is referred to as both the Evening Star and the 
Morning Star, but the extension of which is the same. 
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 Th ese, however, are shift ing sands, especially if one adopts a contextualist approach, 
which Sheehan and Arvind suggest is one not so much interested in there being  ‘ some inher-
ent quality about a concept ’, 17 as the application of the concept in particular circumstances. 
 An example might be found in the case of estoppel. Th e infl uence of a contextual 
approach which looks at the application of a concept in particular circumstances has seen a 
shift  away from the  ‘ fi ve probanda ’ (or sub-concepts of proprietary estoppel) of  Willmott v 
Barber , 18 to a looser set of sub-concepts or criteria: representation, reliance and detriment. 19 
Indeed, it might be argued that the concept of estoppel now overlaps with the concept of 
constructive trust. 20 So, the intension of estoppel has changed. At the same time, however, 
those very sub-concepts that make up the concept of estoppel are subject to variation, so 
while we may teach students that these three elements are required, in fact the case-law 
suggests there are many variations of, for example, representation, so it is diffi  cult to be 
absolute about what constitutes a representation 21 and whether the concept is the same 
in domestic or commercial contexts, or situations of imperfect gift , unilateral mistake or 
common expectation cases. 22 Th ere is, then, scope for manipulating (depending on one ’ s 
viewpoint or theoretical approach) the constituent elements of a concept and their impor-
tance. For example, in  Taylors Fashions , Oliver J observed (regardless of the category of 
estoppel being referred to) that what was required was: 
 a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular indi-
vidual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which 
knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment 
than to enquiring whether the circumstances can be fi tted within the confi nes of some precon-
ceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour. 23 
 Sheehan and Arvind ask  ‘ What are the consequences of highlighting certain factors while 
omitting others ? ’ 24 Th e answer either must be that certain sets of facts or circumstances 
fall outside the concept or are brought within it, and this intended or unintended result 
is determined by the normative underpinnings of the concept and its sub-concepts. So, 
if judges fi nd on the facts and through a broad application of the sub-concepts that there 
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is an estoppel, then this might undermine or eventually change the intension of estoppel. 
Changing the content or meaning of concepts by themselves will not necessarily create a 
new taxonomy, but from a contextual/realist perspective, it is important that a taxonomy 
of property law should be suffi  ciently dynamic to accommodate the judicial development 
of concepts, particularly if this judicial response is in reaction to changing norms refl ecting 
changes in society. Th e taxonomy we adopt may have consequences for how fl exible we can 
be in developing and applying individual concepts within that taxonomy. 
 Th e question for taxonomy appears to be how this evolution of norms or the  ‘ moral 
element ’ 25 of concepts can be used to marry conceptual and contextual approaches to create 
new taxonomies, or, how do we taxonomise shift ing concepts ? One approach suggested by 
Sheehan and Arvind is to adopt a Hegelian teleological approach, ie what is the purpose 
of the law ? Th is can be both  ‘ backwards-looking and forwards-looking ’, 26 but it does 
require engagement with, and revaluation of concepts and categories as well as a recogni-
tion of the ways in which concepts and categorisation  ‘ constrain and shape the manner in 
which the law responds ’, 27 which may sit uneasily with contextualists ’ view of the  ‘ inher-
ently indeterminate nature of concepts ’. 28 Th e danger of a teleological approach is that 
it may be very undemocratic, refl ecting the interests of a dominant elite or a particular 
political agenda. Alternatively, in looking forward it could strive to be more democratic, 
less party-politics orientated, and more inclusive. A teleological shift  in housing law, for 
example, might involve the expansion or reduction of social housing. 
 III. Th e Taxonomy of Property Law 
 Eveline Ramaekers points out that before we can decide what property law is, we have to 
be sure that there is such a category as  ‘ property law ’ that can be marked out from other 
areas of law. 29 She highlights the many diff erent ways of looking at property. Th e fact that 
we might refer to the teaching of  ‘ Land Law ’, or of  ‘ Commercial Property Law ’ underscores 
the challenge and the way in which lawyers subsequently think about property based on 
the pragmatic considerations of legal education. As will be seen in the examples below (and 
as became very evident at the 2018 Modern Studies in Property Law conference), there are 
not always clear boundaries between, say, property law and tort law, 30 or contract law 31 or 
even criminal law. 32 Ramaekers focuses in particular on the fuzzy boundaries between the 
law of property and the law of obligations and the diff erent ways in which these are deline-
ated in diff erent authorities and in diff erent legal systems. If one accepts these overlapping 
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boundaries then the categorisation of property law needs to be based on concepts which 
are themselves not subject-bound. So, for example, if one bases property law on the law of 
things, or the  ‘ thinginess ’ of the subject-matter, then one is immediately faced with the chal-
lenges of new forms of property. Similarly, one might argue the same for the term  ‘ resource ’ 
used by Gray, insofar as while this suggests a  ‘ thing ’ to which a value is attached, what is 
valued will change as society changes. For the purposes of this chapter, I propose to adopt 
Gray ’ s view 33 that property is about control over access and the power to exclude: 
 ‘ Property ’ is the power-relation constituted by the state ’ s endorsement of private claims to regulate 
the access of strangers to the benefi ts of particular resources. If, in respect of a given claimant 
and a given resource, the exercise of such regulatory control is physically impracticable or legally 
abortive or morally or socially undesirable, we say that such a claimant can assert no  ‘ property ’ in 
that resource. 34 
 Th is categorisation, based on a number of separate but inter-related concepts (control, 
access, power, exclusion, etc), avoids too much consideration of the nature of the  ‘ thing ’ 
or  ‘ resource ’ and focuses instead on relationships. It also, I think, lies at the essence of the 
diverging views of the Hull councillor and the BBC Arts Editor and, when the concepts are 
examined in the context of the examples below, admits the possibility of a new taxonomy. 
 Gray ’ s defi nition is attractive (for my purposes) because he argues that dominium is not 
limitless but may be  ‘ curtailed by limitations of a broadly  “ moral ” character ’. 35 Property, 
he argues, is limited to the control exercised over access. 36 He also points out that prop-
erty is not a thing; that some resources are not propertised  – and therefore belong to no 
one or to everyone. Even if they are propertised, dominium is subject to limitations, incur-
sions and restrictions, and property is dynamic and potentially a morally limited concept 
because  ‘ physical, legal and moral conditions of excludability may vary according to time 
and circumstance ’. 37 Together this suggests that there is some room for change, but the start-
ing point is that something is property if it has the attribute of excludability:  ‘A resource 
is  “ excludable ” only if it is feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control over 
the access of strangers to the various benefi ts inherent in the resource. ’ 38 He suggests that 
there are three grounds on which non-excludability may rest: physical, legal, and moral. 
Gray acknowledges that what is an excludable or non-excludable resource  – and therefore 
property  – is fl uid. What might not be property today could be property tomorrow. 
 Most importantly, Gray suggests that  ‘ the test of moral excludability is much more closely 
concerned with those social conventions or mores which promote integrative social exist-
ence than with any normative judgment about individual human conduct. ’ 39 He is referring 
to what we might regard as the global commons or resources for the common good, but his 
test does not have to be limited to these, because as he states: 
 In setting the moral limits of  ‘ property ’, the courts eff ectively recognise that there is some serial 
ranking of legally protected values and interests: claims of  ‘ property ’ may sometimes be  overridden 
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by the need to attain or further more highly rated social goals  … Th e predominating emphasis 
expressed in the notion of moral non-excludability is the need to aff ord especial protection to 
those values which promote human communication and social intercourse. 40 
 Th e important point  – for this chapter, is that  ‘ property rights are merely prima facie 
rights which may be abridged or overridden by other moral concerns ’. 41 Gray goes on to 
point out that these moral limits can include land. He cites the example of the  Australian 
case of  Gerhardy v Brown . 42 In this case the requirement for non-Pitjantjatjaras (the 
Pitjantjatjara are an Aboriginal peoples) to have permission to enter lands designated 
under the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 was challenged as being contrary to the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and the normal incidents of ownership. Th e High Court of 
Australia held that in the context of this particular land, the exclusion by operation of statute 
was lawful. Commenting on the case, Gray concludes 
 Although accepting that the right to exclude strangers is ordinarily an incident of ownership of 
land the Court was able to contemplate circumstances in which this right of exclusion might 
be abridged by more highly valued social objectives. In thus delineating the limits of  ‘ property ’, 
the High Court signifi cantly emphasised the need to promote those moral or political standards 
which enrich life and constructive social interaction within a community of equals. 43 
 In this case, the statutory restrictions were a special measure to address historical racial 
inequalities. 44 
 Th e consideration of moral grounds for non-excludability calls into play the intersection 
of public and private. Although he is primarily referring to private property Gray points 
out that no property is truly private, 45  ‘ and in underpinning the law of  ‘ property ’ the state 
indirectly adjudicates an exceedingly broad range of the power-relations permitted within 
society. ’ 46 If our taxonomy of property focusses only on private law, there is a danger that the 
infl uence and impact of the state or the public parts of property law will be overlooked. Th is 
is signifi cant not only in practical terms but also for informing the norms underpinning 
concepts. Th is is played out in the debate as to the Hull Banksy work. Both spokesper-
sons are private individuals representing public bodies  – the council and the BBC. Both are 
expressing what might be private or offi  cial (public) views and both are drawing on certain 
understandings of valued social objectives. 
 Adopting a developmental/contextualist approach which, as suggested by Sheehan and 
Arvind, is  ‘ more  ‘ socially and empirically grounded ’, 47 and  ‘ more  evidently linked to social 
facts and circumstances ’, 48 and drawing on the concept and sub-concepts in Gray ’ s defi ni-
tion, it may be possible to defi ne property in a way that is suffi  ciently fl exible to take into 
account changing realities and values, without abandoning established tenets entirely. Th e 
following table suggests how Gray and Sheehan and Arvind might be brought together. 
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 Gray  Sheehan and Arvind 
 Excludability  Primary concept 
 Power  Sub-concept the extension of which is endorsement by the state 
 Access  Sub-concept the extension of which is regulation of benefi ts 
 Control  Sub-concept the extension of which is a physically possible, legally eff ective and 
morally defensible power to exclude 
 If we apply the concepts to a set of facts, then where the state endorses the exercise of the 
power to exclude through its legal frameworks and agents; regulates access to the benefi ts 
by determining who may and may not have access; and  – through aff ording remedies or 
imposing sanctions  – upholds the control of the subject-matter, then there is property. Th is 
might be illustrated by considering how courts determine if there is a lease rather than a 
lesser right. An interpretivist, preferring certainty, might hold that unless there is a term 
certain and exclusive possession there is no lease, whereas the contextualist might argue 
that the rigour of exclusive possession needs to be subject to a further set of sub-concepts 
because of the unscrupulous behaviour of some landlords. An example of this can be found 
in the case of  Antoniades v Villiers . 49 Th is then raises the question of what norms underpin 
the inclusion/exclusion determined by the extension of these concepts. It is here that we 
can see the relevance of Gray ’ s three grounds on which non-excludability based on control 
may rest. 
 To illustrate this I focus on the contextual and factual interaction of people with surface 
areas  – largely but not solely  – in urban environments. In doing so I intend to draw atten-
tion to Gray ’ s three grounds for non-excludability (physical, legal and moral), and thereby 
challenge  ‘ the continued validity and desirability of the normative underpinnings of exist-
ing legal categories ’. 50 In this way it might be possible to arrive at a slightly diff erent set of 
sub-concepts which then inform a new  ‘ realist taxonomic enterprise ’ 51 that is compatible 
with Dagan ’ s aim of  ‘ constantly challenging the continued validity and desirability of the 
normative underpinnings of existing legal categories ’. 52 
 IV. Guerilla Gardeners, Graffi  tti Artists, 
and Park-Runners 
 Th ere is a broad spectrum of human interaction with the surfaces of the physical environ-
ment from lawful to beyond the law, or  ‘ outlawed ’ activity, which takes place on horizontal 
and vertical surfaces that may be regarded as private or public property, or private or public 
space, or may fall somewhere in between (the abandoned bridge in Hull is a case in point). 
For purposes of illustration, the social interaction of three groups of people with the 
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physical space of urban areas will be considered: guerrilla gardeners, graffi  ti artists, and 
park-runners. Each of these groups engages with the surfaces of the environment in diff er-
ent ways and their engagement refl ects something other than property interests as currently 
defi ned, but does raise issues of power, access, and control. Th is is not to suggest the law 
is irrelevant; rather that the law both shapes and infl uences social action and operates as 
a trigger for resistance and rebellion. Th e past (backward-looking) therefore informs the 
present, and prompts us to think about change (forward-looking). Th ese activities have 
been selected because they challenge excludability, either physically, legally and/or morally, 
and therefore our understanding of what property is. 
 In urban areas while the physical boundaries of place may be more apparent due to 
the hard-edged environment, the boundaries of spaces are more porous and may be more 
 volatile. 53 Spaces may be  ‘ claimed ’ by city parks authorities, private householders, individu-
als or collectives, relying on legal concepts informed by accepted and oft en-unchallenged 
normative or moral underpinnings. Skateboarders, graffi  ti artists, gangs, rough sleepers, 
guerrilla gardeners, and people on the move may make claims to place, either temporar-
ily or more permanently. If Gray ’ s emphasis on excludability as a defi ning characteristic 
of property is applied, then the question is who controls these places, who has access, who 
benefi ts and therefore which set of facts or objects falls within the defi nition of the concept ? 
For example, the graffi  ti artist who throws up a  ‘ piece ’ claims the wall, railway siding, fence, 
as his or her  ‘ spot ’ or place  –  ‘ this is mine, I was here ’. Th e person sleeping in a doorway 
defends his or her place, marking it with a selection of paraphernalia to indicate its bounda-
ries; the seed-bomber planting in the small gaps around council trees in the pavement, 
makes a fl eeting claim to the garden created; residents cultivating vegetables on the mini-
roundabout in a residential street may make a longer-term commitment. Th e relationship 
of people in these examples to the places they use are empirical facts and socially grounded: 
people do these things and they do them for a social reason. Th e claims they make in respect 
of the surfaces/property they use may not be claims of ownership as generally understood, 
because the space may be  ‘ owned ’ by others, even if within the public domain (here used 
in a non-legal sense). However, these acts of engagement demonstrate the relationship  – 
perhaps merely transient  – of the individual or collective with the physical environment 
in which they are located and with society, and various values in society. A descriptive or 
prescriptive taxonomy of property law cannot accommodate these engagements. A develop-
mental taxonomy might do so in so far as  ‘ developmental taxonomies see the law as being in 
a process of change ’. 54 If, following a realist or contextualist approach, the law is to respond 
to change, then the concepts that inform it also have to change. Th e following practical 
realities are used to demonstrate how Gray ’ s concept of property might be developed by 
incorporating some sub-concepts into the idea of exclusion as a defi ning characteristic 
of property. 
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 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8548005.stm . 
  56  S  Farran ,  ‘ Earth Under the Nails :  Th e Extraordinary Return to the Land ’ in  N  Hopkins (ed),  Modern Studies 
in Property Law , vol  7 ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2013 )  173 – 91 ;  O  Zanetti ,  Guerrilla Gardening:  Geographers and 
Gardeners, Actors and Networks: Reconsidering Urban Public Space ( MA/MSc dissertation ,  Queen Mary ,  University 
of London ,  2007 ) available at:  http://www.guerrillgardening.org/books/ZanettiGG.pdf . 
  57  G  McKay ,  Radical Gardening:  Politics, Idealism and Rebellion in the Garden ( London ,  Francis Lincoln Limited , 
 2011 ) . 
  58  BBC Trending ‚  ‘ Th ai Women Take Dip in the Road in Pothole Protest ’,  BBC News ( London ,  29 September 
2016 ) available at:  https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-37485461 . 
  59  A search of reported cases on the legal data base Westlaw revealed very few cases in which prosecutions were 
brought. See also  B  Daniel ,  ‘ “ Guerrilla Gardeners ” in Morpeth Risk Prosecution to Carry Out Clean Up ’,  Chroni-
cleLive ( Newcastle ,  29 September 2014 ) available at:  https://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/
guerilla-gardeners-morpeth-risk-prosecution-7847167 . 
  60  For example the embankments or roundabouts. 
 A. Guerrilla Gardeners 
 Th e guerrilla gardening movement in its present form fi rst started in New York in the 1970s 
as part of the counter-culture movement of the time. 55 Today it might be seen as part of 
a much wider socio-cultural movement of individual and community engagement with 
gardening in diverse ways, which refl ects growing concern with the environment, with 
sustainable development, with the accountability of public authorities, and with the reten-
tion or safeguarding of public space. 56 Guerrilla gardening might also be carried out as a 
form of protest. 57 For example, a recent manifestation of guerrilla gardening is the construc-
tion of miniature gardens in potholes in roads to draw attention to poor road maintenance. 58 
Alternatively, it may also be viewed positively as a social and cultural phenomenon which 
brings people together either as individual members of the movement or as groups initi-
ating community projects. Th ere is therefore a certain moral ambivalence surrounding 
guerrilla gardening: Is it a constructive or destructive use of property ? Is it beautifi cation or 
vandalism ? Is it anti-social, because it is oft en secretive or done without permission ? Or is 
it in fact socially constructive, bringing people with common concerns together ? Are there 
in fact moral grounds for non-excludability ? If so, what are these and how extensive should 
they be ? 
 In principle, there is legal excludability, not least because of the legal control of 
spaces. In practice, however, the available legal tools appear weak. Firstly, on the face of 
it,  guerrilla gardening engages less with property law and more with the law of tort and 
potential breaches of the criminal law (although prosecution of guerrilla gardeners in the 
UK seems very rare). 59 While gardening on some locations may raise health and safety 
issues, 60 the positive actions of guerrilla gardeners might counteract the negative actions 
of the local authority or private landowner who might otherwise be charged with health 
and safety off ences  – for example, because of the rubbish fl y-tipped on land, or the use to 
which it is put for drug-dealing and prostitution. Th e moral grounds for an owner ’ s right to 
exclude are thus undermined. Similarly, while the tort of trespass is available to landlords 
or owners of guerrilla gardened spaces, the quantum of damages is likely to be negligi-
ble, especially if the guerrilla gardeners have cleared the space of rubbish and enhanced it 
aesthetically by planting. Suing in the tort of nuisance is also unlikely to be successful, espe-
cially where the gardeners may have removed a number of pre-existing potential nuisances. 
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  61  R  Hudson ,  ‘ Guerrilla Gardens: What Happens When Communities Take Over Council Land ’  Th e Guard-
ian ( London ,  3 June 2014 ) available at  https://www.theguardian.com/local-government-network/2014/jun/03/
guerrilla-gardens-communities-council-land-social . 
  62  O  Kolokouris ,  ‘ Urban Gardening in Greece  – A New Form of Protest ’ ( 2015 )  11  Green European Journal  43 . 
  63  Crime  Concern ,  ‘ Vandalism, Graffi  ti and Environmental Nuisance on Public Transport  – Literature Review ’ 
( London ,  Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions ,  2004 ) ;  A  Akbar and  P  Vallely ,  ‘ Graffi  ti: 
Street Art  – or Crime ? ’,  Th e Independent ( London ,  16 July 2008 ) available at:  http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/features/graffi  ti-street-art-ndash-or-crime-868736.html . 
  64  Akbar and Vallely (ibid);  D  Rogers ,  ‘ Speaking With: Cameron McAuliff e on Graffi  ti, Art and 
Crime ’,  Th e Conversation ( Melbourne ,  24 March 2015 ) available at:  http://theconversation.com/
speaking-with-cameron-mcauliff e-on-graffi  ti-art-and-crime-39183 . 
  65  Th e artistic presentation of  ‘ signatures ’. 
  66  N  Sanchez ,  ‘ Graffi  ti: Art Th rough Vandalism: A Look at the Urban Art Movement Th rough the Scope of 
Aesthetics and Illegality ’ ( Communication Over the Internet, University of Florida ,  undated ) available at:  http://
iml.jou.ufl .edu/projects/fall07/Sanchez/art.html ;  N  Patel ,  ‘ Graffi  ti in Austin: Crime or Art ? ’ ( Graffi  tti vs Art ,  April 
2010 ) available at:  https://whatisart320.wordpress.com/ . 
  67  C  McAuliff e and  K  Iveson ,  ‘Art and Crime (and Other Th ings Besides  … ) :  Conceptualising Graffi  ti in the City ’ 
( 2011 )  5  Geography Compass  128, 130 . 
  68  Graffi  ti falls under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which states  ‘A person who without lawful 
excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property 
Moreover, these activities may take place on  ‘ orphaned ’ or abandoned land the ownership of 
which is unclear, so from a property law perspective there is no one to bring an action. Th ere 
is also land that has been purchased for development, oft en by speculative absentee inves-
tors or local councils, which is left  undeveloped. So it may be many years before the guerrilla 
gardening activity is challenged. Th e issue of legal excludability is also undermined by the 
 ‘ adoption ’ of guerrilla projects by local councils or communities keen to gain the moral high 
ground on green or environmentally sensitive policies, 61 or an owner ’ s willingness to toler-
ate the projects as a form of  ‘ harmless ’ protest. 62 
 B. Graffi  ti Artists 
 Mixed attitudes towards graffi  ti are evident in the example at the start of this chapter. In 
some cases and in some places graffi  ti may be regarded as cultural heritage  – indeed attend-
ees at the 2018 Socio-Legal Studies Association conference in Bristol were off ered a cultural 
tour of the works of Banksy. Others share the view of the Hull city councillor and have 
suggested that graffi  ti is no more than vandalism, anti-social behaviour, and an attack on 
private property; 63 still others have ambivalent views. 64 Negative stereotyping may be due 
to the failure to distinguish between diff erent forms of graffi  ti, or because the line between 
what might be regarded as mere  ‘ tagging ’ 65 and what is regarded as  ‘ art ’ in the world of 
graffi  ti is contentious. 66 Not all share the view that graffi  ti is  ‘ street art ’, not least because 
of the location of the expression. Banksy himself is quoted as asking,  ‘ Is graffi  ti art or 
vandalism ? Th at word (art) has a lot of negative connotations and it alienates people, so no, 
I don ’ t like to use the word  “ art ” at all. ’ 67 Indeed the very term  ‘ art ’ may be contrary to the 
political and social messaging behind graffi  ti. 
 Clearly, the act of graffi  ti breaches the physical excludability of the sites where it appears. 
As with guerrilla gardening, from the perspective of legal excludability graffi  ti straddles 
public and private law. It is categorised as criminal damage, 68 and potentially attracts a 
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or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an off ence ’. 
Damage that is evidently less than  £ 5,000 in value is tried as a summary off ence (subject to a fi xed fi ne) in the 
Magistrates ’ Court (Magistrates ’ Courts Act 1980). Where the damage is less than  £ 5,000 the maximum sentence 
is three months ’ imprisonment or a fi ne of  £ 2,500 for adult off enders. 
  69  For those aged 12 – 17 years, the maximum custodial penalty is a detention and training order of up to 24 
months. 
  70  In England and Wales, s 48 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 gives local authorities the power to serve 
graffi  ti removal notices on certain bodies responsible for the surface where graffi  ti has appeared. Th ese bodies 
include the owners of street furniture (bus shelters, street signs, phone boxes, etc). In England and Wales, the Clean 
Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005 enlarges the powers of local authorities and the police. 
  71  Guidelines issued by the UK Government suggest a caution for the minor off ence of writing graffi  ti on a bus 
shelter:  https://www.gov.uk/caution-warning-penalty . 
  72  R v Fiak [ 2005 ]  EWCA Crim 2381 , [2005] Po LR 211. 
  73  Morphitis v Salmon [ 1990 ]  Crim LR 48 . 
  74  See cases cited by  I  Edwards ,  ‘ Banksy ’ s Graffi  ti :  A Not-so-Simple Case of Criminal Damage ’ ( 2009 )  73 ( 4 )  Jour-
nal of Criminal Law  345 – 61 . 
  75  ibid 351. 
  76  Criminal Damage Act 1971 s 1:  ‘A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belong-
ing to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether such property 
would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an off ence ’. 
  77  Edwards (n 74 above). 
  78  Section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971  Error! Bookmark not defi ned. provides that a lawful excuse 
may be raised if:  ‘ at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the off ence he believed that the person or 
punishment of imprisonment for adult off enders if the damage (usually assessed by the 
cost of removal of the graffi  ti) exceeds  £ 5,000. 69 Minor graffi  ti off ences are punishable by a 
penalty notice of  £ 50 issued under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, 70 or a caution. 71 In 
other words while some graffi  ti is criminalised as being merely anti-social, other graffi  ti is 
criminalised as damage to property. 
 However, criminalising graffi  ti is not without its problems. Firstly, there is the issue of 
whether a specifi c piece of graffi  ti  – or all graffi  ti (and the law makes no distinction)  – is 
 ‘ damage ’. Th is term is not defi ned in the legislation but has been explained as being when 
the value or usefulness of a thing is impaired, 72 permanently or temporarily. 73 Th e limits of 
this defi nition are evident in the decisions of the courts, where it has been held that whether 
or not there is damage is a matter for the jury to decide so that graffi  ti  may be damage, but 
equally it  may not. 74 As Edwards points out, 
 the spatial contexts in which graffi  ti is situated need to be considered if its social, aesthetic and legal 
signifi cance is to be appreciated. Th ey (the court decisions) also show the contested economic, 
social and political value of some publicly situated property. 75 
 Secondly, if the property is neither destroyed nor damaged, and there is no intent to do 
so, can this be labelled criminal damage ? 76 Much may depend on the phrase  ‘ without 
lawful excuse ’. Does the creation of a work or art amount to a lawful excuse  – which might 
undermine legal excludability, or is this merely a moral argument  – which if upheld could 
undermine moral excludability ? What is art is a very subjective point of course and may 
have no place in informing legal concepts: the Hull Banksy is a case in point. For many 
(including Banksy) the term  ‘ art ’ may have negative connotations and be rejected by the 
artist even though others may refer to the work as  ‘ art ’. Could, however, the aesthetic 
enhancement of an ugly hoarding or boarded up warehouse aff ord a  ‘ lawful excuse ’ for an 
otherwise potentially criminal act, thereby providing a defence to the charge ? 77 Under the 
relevant criminal law, a  ‘ lawful excuse ’ rests on the belief of consent. 78 Such is the nature of 
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persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction of or damage to the property in question 
had so consented, or would have so consented to it if he or they had known of the destruction or damage and its 
circumstances  … ’ . Th e belief does not have to be justifi ed. 
  79  BBC  News ,  ‘ Hull Window Cleaner Saves Defaced Banksy Mural ’,  BBC News ( London ,  29 January 2018 ) avail-
able at:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-humber-42857424 . 
  80  Under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 a local authority can serve notice on the property owner if, 
in the authority ’ s opinion, the graffi  ti it is detrimental to the amenity of an area (s 215). 
  81  In 2011 in Bristol, for example the city hosted the UK ’ s largest ever permanent street art project  ‘ See No Evil ’. 
  82  Aft er one of Banksy ’ s works was scrubbed off  a wall in Bristol in 2014, the Mayor of Bristol said  ‘ He (referring 
to Banksy) is part of what gives Bristol its artistic, creative and subversive spirit which makes us such a sparky 
place ’ :  P  Flanagan ,  ‘ Banksy ’ s Boost for Bristol Youth Club ’,  Th e Telegraph ( London ,  15 April 2014 ) available at: 
 http://telegraph.co.uk/culture/culturenews/10768697/Banksys-boost-for-Bristol-youth-club.html . 
  83  See  C  Lerman ,  ‘ Protecting Artistic Vandalism :  Graffi  ti and Copyright Law ’ ( 2013 )  2  New York University Jour-
nal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law  295 . 
  84  Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, s 4(1), amended in parts by the Intellectual Property Act 2014. 
  85  Anonymous work may still be subject to copyright for a statutory period of time  – see, s 12(2), Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 in the UK. 
  86  Section 78, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
  87  J  Davies ,  ‘Art Crimes ? Th eoretical Perspectives on Copyright Protection for Illegally Created Graffi  ti Art ’ 
( 2012 )  65  Maine Law Review  28 – 55 . 
graffi  ti that this is unlikely  – except where work is commissioned or surfaces are intention-
ally provided for graffi  ti. If, however, the artist is an eminent graffi  ti artist then he/she might 
presume consent  – the graffi  ti will aft er all enhance the value of the building. If the surface is 
a public building, even if in  ‘ private ’ ownership, could the consent of the public be relevant ? 
Could the possibility of subsequent public approbation of damage to publicly owned build-
ings allow a defendant to meet the test for the lawful excuse defence in section 5(2)(a) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 by showing that 
 he believed that the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruc-
tion of or damage to the property in question had so consented or would have so consented to it if 
he or they had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances  ? 
 In Hull one visitor to the new Banksy described seeing the piece as  ‘ a dream come true ’, and 
when vandals tried to deface it, a window cleaner was hailed in the local press as saving it 
aft er cleaning whitewash off  it. 79 Subsequent plans by the publicly elected council for regen-
eration of the area through graffi  ti also suggest ex post facto approbation. 
 While in principle the law may provide for excludability, Gray ’ s warning that there is no 
such thing as wholly private property should be borne in mind. Indeed, in England public 
authorities may order graffi  ti to be cleaned off  private property even if the owner of that 
property wishes to retain the graffi  ti. 80 Further, despite the reach of the criminal law, some 
boroughs and councils set aside graffi  ti areas known as  ‘ free walls ’ or adopt a no- prosecution 
policy in respect of certain areas, which become  ‘ graffi  ti tolerance zones ’, 81 or identify graf-
fi ti as local or national heritage. 82 Th is suggests that whatever the criminal law might say, 
private property owners are adopting rather diff erent standpoints. 
 Leaving aside the public law, there are also dilemmas in the private law of intellectual 
property. 83 Th e creator of a work of graffi  ti has intellectual property rights to that work, 
provided graffi  ti is regarded as a  ‘ work ’, 84 although because of the potential criminal conse-
quences or desire for anonymity, the  ‘ artist ’ may not wish to be identifi ed. 85 Even if these 
rights are limited to moral rights 86 because of the  ‘ unlawfulness ’ of the activity, 87 these are 
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  88  P  McGrath ,  ‘ Banksy Under the Hammer: Graffi  ti and the Law ’ ( Incorporated Council of Law Reporting Blog , 
 6 March 2013 ) available at:  http://www.iclr.co.uk/banksy-under-the-hammer-graffi  ti-and-the-law/ . 
  89  Flanagan (n 82 above);  I  Johnston ,  ‘ Banksy Breaks Cover to Join Debate over  “ Mobile Lovers ” Artwork ’,  Th e 
Independent ( London ,  8 May 2014 ) available at:  http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/
banksy-breaks-cover-to-join-debate-over-disputed-mobile-lovers-artwork-9335129.html . Banksy gave permis-
sion to the Broad Plain and Riverside Youth Project to take ownership of the piece  ‘ Mobile Lovers ’. Th e mayor of 
the city is reported to have said  ‘ I hope it will be respected and protected as we would want for  any other legitimate 
work of street art ’ (emphasis added). 
  90  Integrity refers to the artist ’ s right to object to any derogatory treatment. See  E  Bonadio ,  ‘ Banksy Strikes Again: 
Basquiat, Graffi  ti, and the Issue of Copyright Law ’,  Th e Conversation ( Melbourne ,  22 September 2017 ) . 
  91  Under a Lockean approach to property both the graffi  ti artist and the guerrilla gardener might seek to assert 
the property rights of their labours. 
  92  See for example, the annual Dundee Graffi  ti Jam; but note too  G  Ogston ,  ‘ West End of Dundee Hit by 
 “ Paris ” Graffi  ti Tag ’,  Th e Courier ( Dundee ,  3 January 2015 ) available at:  https://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/local/
dundee/125125/west-end-of-dundee-hit-by-paris-graffi  ti-tag/ . 
  93  M  Dragi ć evi ć - Š e š i ć ,  ‘ Th e Street as Political Space :  Walking as Protest, Graffi  ti and the Student Carnivaliza-
tion of Belgrade ’ ( 2001 )  17  New Th eatre Quarterly  74 ;  E  Pindado ,  ‘ Graffi  ti Artists Turn Mexico City ’ s Walls into 
a Collective Cry of Protest ’,  Splinter News ( 13 March 2015 ) available at:  http://fusion.net/story/102767/graffi  ti-
artists-turn-mexico-citys-walls-into-a-collective’cry-of-protests/ ;  S  Jacobs ,  ‘ Th e Graffi  ti in Greece Shows Just How 
Angry its Citizens Really Are ’,  Business Insider UK ( London ,  24 June 2015 ) available at:  http://uk.businessinsider.
com/greeces-graffi  ti-artists-send-powerful-messages-of-protest-2015-6 . 
still control and benefi t rights recognised in law, and the law itself makes no reference to 
whether the act of creativity has to be lawful. Moreover, with art extending to encompass 
installations, public art, and performance art, it has been suggested, at least in the Banksy 
case, that the removal of the mural and its sale by auction could be a breach of the rights 
pertaining to the original artwork (removal of the medium of expression ie the wall). 88 Th e 
implication of a continuing intellectual property right was manifest in 2014 when Banksy 
gave his permission for one of his works  ‘ Mobile Lovers ’  – originally attached to the building 
but subsequently removed for safe-keeping  – to be sold by a youth centre in Bristol to raise 
funds. 89 Alternatively, any act aimed at the physical property that damages the graffi  ti could 
be viewed as a breach of the copyright to the integrity of the work. 90 Potentially therefore 
there could be a clash of property interests between, for example, the owner of a wall and the 
graffi  ti artist whose work adorns that wall. 91 
 As with guerrilla gardening, the property rights of others may be infringed because of 
the potentially law-breaking nature of both activities, but the moral grounds for excludabil-
ity may be undermined where these activities are adopted and/or  ‘ legitimised ’ by the public 
or private sector: in the case of graffi  ti through commissioning, public approbation or the 
dedication of specifi c public and private surfaces for graffi  ti artists. 92 Normative contro-
versy surrounds both. Th ese activities also show that the intensions of concepts such as  ‘ art ’, 
 ‘ damage ’,  ‘ trespass ’,  ‘ greening the environment ’ could all apply to these extensions, thereby 
presenting challenges for a taxonomy, given that very diff erent concepts could apply to the 
same extension. So for example, those interested in the artistic dimension of graffi  ti might 
ask  ‘ is it art ? ’, whereas those interested in the political dimension would perhaps focus on 
the use of art and/or graffi  ti as protest; 93 while lawyers might see only an infringement of 
property rights. An interpretivist defi nition of property law would place guerrilla garden-
ing or graffi  ti outside the law because of non-compliance with certain concepts, while a 
more liberal, socially attuned, contextualist approach might bring the activity within the law 
because of the creative and communal qualities it fosters. Alternatively we might see these 
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  94  M  Halsey and  A  Young ,  ‘ “ Our Desires are Ungovernable ” : Writing Graffi  ti in an Urban Space ’ ( 2006 )  10  Th eo-
retical Criminology  275, 286 . 
  95  Gray (n 33 above) 281. 
  96  ibid. 
  97  Th e petition was rejected on the grounds that the Health Secretary did not have the power to intervene in the 
Parish Council ’ s decision. 
  98  See the Parkrun website:  http://www.parkrun.org.uk/aboutus/ . 
  99  J  Glover ,  ‘ Th e Parkrun Furore and the Battle for Parks ’ ( Local Government Information Unit ,  13 May 2016 ) 
available at:  http://www.lgiu.org.uk/2016/05/13/the-parkrun-furore-and-the-battle-for-parks/ . 
surfaces of the urban landscape as neutral or  ‘ negative space ’  – a term used by graffi  ti artists 
interviewed by Halsey and Young in their studies in Australia, 94 where claims of  ‘ property ’ 
are overridden. 95 
 C. Park-Runners 
 As Gray suggests,  ‘ Th e predominating emphasis expressed in the notion of moral non-
excludability is the need to aff ord especial protection to those values which promote human 
communication and social intercourse ’. 96 Th is possibility is illustrated by the debate, which 
erupted in April 2016, surrounding  ‘ park-runs ’. Th ese running events held in public spaces 
are proving popular, but have provoked controversy regarding fee-charging by councils (on 
grounds such as costs of maintenance) and policies regarding group-users, and complaints 
from other park-users. Th e controversy started with Stoke Giff ord Parish Council, which 
said it would exercise its powers under the Local Government Act 1976 to charge a fee. Th is 
local council decision escalated though social media, the press and television, culminat-
ing in a petition to Parliament. 97 It was argued that fi rstly, parks were community assets 
and secondly, there was a tradition of free use by the public. While it would have been 
possible to physically exclude the runners, the non-excludability on moral grounds can 
be seen in the arguments put forward against fees. For example, the benefi ts of the activ-
ity were that park-runs were open to all; they promoted health, wellbeing and community 
spirit and encouraged runners to  ‘ get back to nature ’. Park-running was also supported as 
an antidote to the commercialisation of running in organised events: they were aimed at 
getting the local community involved in exercising and participating by removing barriers 
to equality of opportunity such as fees, equipment/dress requirements. Given that today 
park-running attracts sponsors and supporters and the umbrella organisation  ‘ Parkrun ’ has 
a large complement of staff , the non-commercial angle may be rather suspect. 98 Never-
theless, a number of interesting normative claims relating to the contested space emerge. 
Supporters excluded from running at their local park described themselves as  ‘ exiles ’, while 
offi  cials pointed to the environmental degradation of the ground subjected to park-runners 
and problems of obstruction for other users, and the infringement of the  ‘ well-being ’ of 
non-runners. 
 While tensions between diff erent park or green space users are not unusual  – see for 
example the frequent notices prohibiting ball games, skate-boarding and so on  – it has been 
suggested that the controversy over park-runs is a symptom of a broader contemporary 
concern: the  ‘ battle of the parks ’. 99 Increasingly people have more leisure and are being 
encouraged through various government and non-government programmes to  ‘ get  out ’ 
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  100  In London, the Royal Parks charge  £ 300 a year for a permit. 
  101  Localism Act 2011, Part 5 chapter 3. 
  102  E  Wallis ,  Places to Be:  Green spaces for active citizenship ( London ,  Fabian Society ,  2015 ) . In 2017 the UK Govern-
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for Communities and Local Government ,  2017 ) . 
  103  MM  Siems ,  ‘A Network-Based Taxonomy of the World ’ s Legal Systems ’ ( Durham ,  Durham Law School Work-
ing Papers ,  2014 )  5 . 
more and engage in healthy lifestyle choices. At the same time upper tier local authori-
ties have responsibility for public health, while in the UK local authorities at all levels and 
the public sector in general are fi nding budgets drastically cut and are having to make 
decisions regarding non-essential services. Th e maintenance of parks and gardens may 
be one area where savings can be made or income increased  – for example by charging 
professional dog walkers permit fees, 100 or by levying charges on specifi c groups of park-
users. In urban areas, the problems of equitable sharing of facilities may be particularly 
acute because of the pressure on and shortage of green spaces and the competing demands 
for building land. Th is is the contextual reality. At the same time, there is the rhetoric 
of engaging more with local communities  – for example under the Localism Act 2011, 
Part 5. Under this legislation, local communities can apply to get green spaces listed as an 
asset of community value, and thereby prevent the sale or change of use of such spaces for 
six months. 101 However, getting a green space listed is only a temporary measure and unless 
the community can raise the funds to buy the green space that is at risk, it is likely to be 
lost. Th e focus is therefore on ownership of green space rather than the maintenance of it, 
but this does present the possibility of public/private/hybrid ownership and/or control of 
parks and other spaces, and the opportunity for rethinking the relationships between local 
and central state and non-state agencies, organisations and communities and the physical 
environment. 102 
 V. Conclusion: Is it Time for a New 
Approach to Defi ning Property ? 
 Th e possibility of a new taxonomy is inspired by Siems ’ s comment that: 
 Since taxonomies can never be a perfect representation of the complexities of the real world, they 
can be seen as, more or less refi ned, conjectures  – and it is then also the tasks of subsequent 
researchers to critically scrutinise these conjectures and try to develop better ones. 103 
 Using Gray ’ s defi nition of property and the sub-concepts that comprise the intension of 
 ‘ excludability ’, which determines whether a  ‘ thing ’ is property or not, I have tested these 
sub-concepts against the facts of various social activities taking place in contexts in which 
property rights may be claimed, but where there may be at the very least moral grounds 
for non-excludability. I suggest that the examples I have chosen prompt us to think about 
when, and in what contexts, the  ‘ right of exclusion might be abridged by more highly valued 
social objectives ’ ? Might there be, as the High Court of Australia recognised, a case for 
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emphasising the need to promote those  ‘ moral or political standards which enrich life 
and constructive social interaction within a community of equals ’ ? 104 
 To do this we might have to move away from a purely legal taxonomy to a more inter-
disciplinary perspective. Th e value of adopting a diff erent approach is expressed by Moore 
who argues:  ‘ Many lawyers and law professors view law as an instrument for controlling 
society and directing social change, but most anthropologists are concerned with law as 
a refl ection of a particular social order. ’ 105 Moving away from an interpretivist/positiv-
ist approach towards a more developmental/contextual approach, it might be possible to 
consider a  ‘ consensus ’ theory of law that conceives of legal norms in broad (and largely 
sociological) terms, in other words the  ‘ living law ’ is what people do, 106 and the repeated 
iteration of the lived experience may give rise to a legal framing. 107 Th is ties in with  Sheehan 
and Arvind ’ s implied question:  ‘ What do we want a taxonomy of the law to do ? ’ Alter-
natives have been suggested by writers such as Barker, 108 Hughes, 109 and Banister and 
Kearns, 110 and, although primarily focused on criminal law controls, such analyses could 
be used to inform a new taxonomy of the law, not least, because, as the examples in this 
chapter show, the ways in which people interact socially with property may not be the 
extension of an existing legal concept but their persistence and reiteration may mean that 
the concept or concepts have to be rethought. Th e moral grounds for doing so might be 
prompted by a greater commitment to environment, citizenship, community, humanity or 
indeed democracy. Current property taxonomy means that some lived experiences remain 
precarious in law or indeed unlawful  – the  ‘ occupation ’ of doorways, railway arches or 
park benches by the homeless may be one example, and degrees of tolerance are inconsist-
ent and very much a  ‘ post-code lottery ’. 111 At the same time, it is important to recognise 
that the lived experience is constantly changing so that the standards to which the High 
Court of Australia referred are neither static nor absolute; they constantly encounter resist-
ance and undergo negotiation. If our taxonomy leads to a rigid defi nition of property then 
it will not be able to accommodate possible changes in the law when the law adapts to 
changing circumstances  – the consultation by the UK Government on the prohibition of 
fees for park-runners is but one example. 112 
 A dynamic taxonomy (rather than a prescriptive one) does not have to mean an 
abrupt severance with the historical development of the current law  – indeed the activities 
described above take place within, but in resistance to, the current taxonomy  – but it may 
106 Sue Farran
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  114  See Brown (n 111 above). 
mean moving the law in a more morally justifi able direction. In the twenty-fi rst century, 
this may require taking into consideration equality of opportunity, human rights, health and 
well-being, and more generally inclusion rather than exclusion. 113 Already there are indica-
tions that the law ’ s defi nition of property has to shift  to encompass things like security of 
the home; accessible and aff ordable housing; healthy and sustainable environments; greener 
cities; and inter-generational equity of resources. 
 If the defi nition of property law remains static, it will become irrelevant. So how might it 
be developed ? As a start, and without deviating too far from Gray, a new set of sub-concepts 
might be introduced. So that if we refer back to the defi nition:  ‘ “ Property ” is the power-
relation constituted by the state ’ s endorsement of private claims to regulate the access of 
strangers to the benefi ts of particular resources ’, we could introduce  ‘ reasonableness ’ into 
regulation, bringing with it sub-concepts of proportionality and necessity (both concepts 
which are encountered frequently, if fl uidly, in law). Further, some consideration might be 
given to the intrusion of  ‘ power-relation ’ refl ecting an acknowledged imbalance between the 
power of the state, the private property owner, and the third-party stranger. An extension 
example can be found in the construction of physical barriers to prevent rough sleepers 
using doorways, benches and bus shelters which has given rise to public protest and adverse 
media coverage, to the extent that in some cases the state has been forced to back down. 114 
Here, it is suggested, the power-relationship has shift ed. As with park-runs, social media 
communication creates a powerful fourth estate. Even where an owner, be it a local authority 
or a private landlord, has the legal right to exclude, moral indignation may mean abandon-
ing or not enforcing that right. Th is is particularly so if the state can no longer endorse the 
exercise of that right or is ambivalent about doing so. Th e fourth estate might argue that 
the guerrilla gardener, the graffi  ti artist, the park-runner and the rough sleeper are all part 
of the  demos refl ected in our understandings of democracy. Consequently, the  ‘ state ’ might 
need to rethink the moral grounds of endorsement and thus exclusion, and this in turn 
might ultimately lead to limits on the legal right to exclude. So, a new sub-set of concepts 
informing the existing defi nition of property could allow a defi nition of property that more 
nearly refl ects the meaning of property in the lived experience of many urban dwellers and 
perhaps better refl ects the values of social justice which are beginning to emerge in the 
second decade of the twenty-fi rst century. If it is to be relevant, a taxonomy of property law 
needs to refl ect this reality. 
